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ON COMPARING THE ACCURACY OF DEFAULT 





We consider 1927 borrowers from 54 countries who had a credit rating by both Moody's and 
S&P at the end of 1998, and their subsequent default history up to the end of 2002. Viewing 
bond ratings as predicted probabilities of default, we consider partial orderings among 
competing probability forecasters and show that Moody's and S&P cannot be ordered 
according to any of these. Therefore, the relative performance of the agencies depends 
crucially on the way in which probability predictions are compared. 
JEL Code: C40, C53. 





















Version August 2007 
Research supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under SFB 475.We are 
grateful to Mark Wahrenburg, Jan-Pieter Krahnen, Martin Weber, Atanasios Mitropoulos and 
two anonymous referees for helpful criticism and comments. 1 Introduction
The evaluation of the quality, in whichever way de¯ned, of default predictions
in the credit industry has received considerable attention recently (Carey 2002,
Engelmann et al. 2003 and many others). In particular, there is a growing
interest in comparing the accuracy of competing rating agencies, or to rate the
raters, so to speak. In the wake of Basel II, there will be a rapidly increasing
number of rating producers, in addition to the established rating agencies, and
an increasing number of borrowers who are rated by at least two of them, so
it is natural to ask: which rater rates best?
This question can be answered in a variety of ways. The most popular method
is based on the accuracy ratio, i.e. on how successful a rating system is in
bucketing the defaults in the "bad" grades, or its equivalent, the area under
the ROC-curve (see section 4 or Sobehard and Keenan 2001 for a convenient
introduction). A rating system is optimal in this sense if its worst grades end up
with comprising all the defaults, and none of the non-defaults, i.e. if all defaults
are rated worse than non-defaults. What is exactly meant by attaching one of
the worst grades to a particular debtor is of no importance here, what matters
is simply that debtors who later on default are considered riskier than debtors
who do not default.
Below, we follow a di®erent approach by viewing ratings as predicted probabili-
ties of default, and by comparing the accuracy of these predictions across rating
agencies. In doing so, we borrow heavily from mathematical statistics, where
the evaluation of probability forecasts has a long and distinguished history (see
e.g. DeGroot and Fienberg 1983, Vardeman and Meeden 1983, DeGroot and
Eriksson 1985, or Winkler 1994, 1996). So far, this methodology has mostly
been applied to weather forecasts (i.e. forecasts of the probability of rain) but
it can easily be extended to default predictions in the rating industry.
2The practical relevance of this exercise is obvious: The Basel II agreement will
leave banks no choice but be attach predicted probabilities of default to all
outstanding dept, so the ability to judge the quality of probability forcasts
will be essential both for the banking business and for investors as well. If one
could show, for instance, that one rater is better able to predict probabilities
of default than another one, then its ratings should be more in°uential as
concerns the yields of bonds rated by both of them, not to mention the ability
to require higher fees.
As an example, we consider 1927 borrowers, mostly industrial ¯rms and ¯nan-
cial institutions from the US (68 % of all borrowers), who had a credit rating
by both Moody's and S&P as of Dec. 31, 1998. We follow these ¯rms up to the
end of 2002 and record all defaults. The data were obtained from Bloomberg
and are available from the authors on request.
Below we apply various orderings of probability forecasts to this data set.
As these orderings are scattered in the statistics literature, we start by col-
lecting and brie°y reviewing them in section 2. Section 3 is concerned with
mapping rating grades to probabilities of default, and section 4 compares the
performance of the ratings, both in terms of partial orderings and in terms of
various scalar measures of performance which have been suggested in the liter-
ature. Section 5 addresses the statistical signi¯cance of the observed di®erences
in performance, and a brief discussion of the shortcomings of our analysis in
section 6 concludes.
2 Partial orderings of probability forecasts
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < ::: < ak = 1 be k predicted probabilities of default. In
practice, k varies from 6 to about 20. The US-based Loan Pricing Corporation
has k = 10. The rating agencies which concern us in the present paper, Moody's
3and S&P, both have scales with k = 21 (taking account of modi¯ers such as +
and - or 1, 2 and 3). For ease of comparability with these established agencies,
most commercial banks also employ scales with k = 21 in their post Basel II
internal rating systems.
Below we take the mechanism employed for the predictions as given. Produc-
ing the predictions is a separate problem which has engendered an enormous
literature, but will not concern us here. Rather, our point of departure is the
discrete bivariate probability function r(µ;aj); µ = 0;1; j = 1;:::;k, resulting
from some such method, whichever it may be, with µ = 1 indicating default
and µ = 0 indicating non-default.
The following additional notation will be used:
p(1) :=
P
j r(1;aj) = overall relative frequency of default.
p(0) :=
P
j r(0;aj) = overall relative frequency of no default.








q(aj) = conditional relative frequency of no default
given probability forecast aj.
q(ajj1) :=
r(1;aj)
p(1) = conditional relative frequency of predicted de-
fault probability aj given default.
q(ajj0) :=
r(0;aj)
p(0) = conditional relative frequency of predicted de-
fault probability aj given no default.
The problem is: given two forecasters A and B, characterized by their re-
spective bivariate probability functions rA(µ;aj) and rB(µ;aj), which one is
"better"?
4One sensible requirement is that among borrowers with predicted default prob-
ability aj, the relative percentage of defaults will be roughly equal to aj. For-
mally:
aj
! = p(1jaj) =
r(1;aj)
q(aj)
whenever q(aj) > 0. Such forecasters are called "well calibrated" (DeGroot
and Fienberg 1983).
However, calibration, though desirable, is not su±cient for a useful forecast.
For instance, a probability forecaster attaching default probability p(1) to all
borrowers is well calibrated but otherwise quite useless.
Let rA(µ;aj) and rB(µ;aj) be the joint probability functions of forecasters
A and B, respectively, with a nondegenerate marginal distribution p(µ). We
assume that this marginal distribution is the same for both forecasters, i.e.
that both agencies rate the same set of borrowers. First, we con¯ne ourselves
to forecasters which are both well calibrated. Following DeGroot and Fienberg
(1983), we say that A is more re¯ned than B, in symbols: A ¸R B, if there
exists a k £k Markov matrix M (i.e. a matrix with nonnegative entries whose












A(aj); i = 1;:::;k: (2)
Equation (1) means that, given A's forecast aj, an additional independent
randomisation is applied according to the conditional distribution Mij (j =
1;:::;k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that of
B. Condition (2) ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated.
Table 1, from KrÄ amer (2003), provides an example. Forecaster A attaches a
default probability of 2 % to all borrowers. If the overall default probability
5is indeed 2 %, he is obviously well calibrated. Forecaster B is more re¯ned; he
attaches default probabilities 1 % and 3 %, respectively, to 50 % of all bor-
rowers. We assume that he, too, is well calibrated. Likewise forecasters C and
D with distributions across predicted default probabilities as given in the table.
Table 1:
The re¯nement ordering
among well calibrated probability forecasters
forecast of distribution of borrowers across
default probability predicted default probabilities
% A B C D
0.5 0 0 0.25 0.2
1 0 0.5 0 0.25
1.5 0 0 0.5 0
2 1 0 0 0
3 0 0.5 0 0.55
4.5 0 0 0.25 0
Obviously, B, C and D are more re¯ned than A. Also, C and D are more re¯ned
than B: If all borrowers who receive a 0.5 % rating from C, and a randomly
selected 50 % of those who receive a rating 1.5 %, are given a rating of 1 %,
the rest a rating of 3 %, we obtain a new, well calibrated forecast with the
same probabilistic properties as B's.
The same can be done with D: All borrowers with ratings 0.5 % and 1 %, and a
randomly selected one-eleventh of borrowers rated 3 %, are given a new rating
of 1 %, the rest a new rating or 3 %. Again, this yields a new, well calibrated
forecast with the same probabilistic properties as B's.
6On the other hand, C and D cannot be compared according to the re¯ne-
ment ordering. DeGroot and Fienberg (1983, Theorem 1) show that, for well
calibrated forecasters A and B,





B(ai)] ¸ 0; j=1,...,k-1: (3)
and this condition is violated for C and D in our example.
Vardeman and Meeden (1983) suggest to alternatively order probability fore-
casters according to the concentration of defaults in the "bad" grades. This
will here be called the VM-default order. Formally:









Or to put this di®erently: A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden default
ordering if its conditional distribution, given default, ¯rst-order stochastically
dominates that of B.
The same can be done for the non-defaults. A is better than B in the VM-non-










Finally, A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden sense (in symbols A¸V MB)
if both A¸V M(d)B and A¸V M(nd)B.
A ¯nal criterion which is favoured in the banking industry (see e.g. Falkenstein











A; j = 1;:::;k (6)
7by straight lines. The resulting plot is variously called the power curve, the
Lorenz curve, the Gini curve, or the cumulative accuracy pro¯le, and a fore-
caster A is considered better than a forecaster B in this - the Gini-default-sense
(formally: A ¸G(d) B) - if A's Gini curve is nowhere below that of B.
The Gini-curve would be diagonal if ratings were unrelated to defaults. There-
fore, the area between the Gini-curve and the diagonal line can be viewed as
measuring the quality of the forecasts { the larger the area, the better the fore-
casts. This area, divided by the area obtained from forecasts where all defaults
are rated worse than non defaults, is called the accuracy ratio; it is the most
popular measure of forecasting performance in the banking industry.
3 Mapping rating grades to default probabili-
ties
Next, we apply the orderings described above to real world default predictions.
Table 2 summarizes our data base. For each rating grade, it shows the number
of debtors carrying this rating as of Dec. 31, 1998, and the number of defaults
up to the end of 2002. There are 17 grades, with all debtors rated worse than
B- or B3 lumped together into grade C.
It is immediate from the table that there must be lots of split ratings. Dis-
regarding the modi¯ers (i.e. the +0s and ¡0s attached by S&P and the 1,2,3
attached by Moody's), there an 540 split ratings overall, with S&P ratings
being better than Moody's ratings in 359 cases and S&P ratings being worse
than Moody's ratings in 181 cases.
8Table 2:
Distribution of borrowers across rating grades
S&P Moody's
rating frequency number rating frequency number
grade of defaults grade of defaults
AAA 55 0 Aaa 42 0
AA+ 33 0 Aa1 47 0
AA 80 0 Aa2 90 0
AA- 157 0 Aa3 142 0
A+ 167 1 A1 160 0
A 201 0 A2 191 2
A- 171 2 A3 154 0
BBB+ 170 3 Baa1 170 3
BBB 189 4 Baa2 180 1
BBB- 148 9 Baa3 165 9
BB+ 77 9 Ba1 69 6
BB 77 11 Ba2 50 2
BB- 85 26 Ba3 90 24
B+ 147 53 B1 76 19
B 106 49 B2 104 36
B- 43 25 B3 114 50
C 21 17 C 83 57
1927 209 1927 209
This percentage of split ratings corresponds to ¯gures reported elsewhere, for
instance in Ederington (1986). The reasons for such split ratings are a topic of
independent interest and shall not concern us here. For instance split ratings
might be an artefact of di®erent procedures used for producing the ratings.
9They may also occur because di®erent raters have di®erent standards of cred-
itworthiness, or because raters which have the same standards simply disagree
on the creditworthiness of a given debtor. See Ederington (1986) or Moon and
Stotsky (1993) for a survey of such issues. As is shown in Ederington et al.
(1987), bond ratings, both by Moody's and S&P, do not incorporate the en-
tirety of available information on the risk of default, so there is ample room
for disagreement even if both agencies make the best use of information avail-
able to them. Such issues certainly merit a lot of attention, but are outside
the scope of the present paper. Rather, we ¯rst proceed under the assump-
tions that (i) the true probabilities of default, given the rating grade, are the
same for both agencies (where the correspondence between grades is as in table
2), and (ii) that the observed di®erences in empirical relative frequencies are
due to random noise. This assumption will be later on relaxed. In addition,
to obtain larger samples, we disregard the + and - modi¯ers and estimate
the grade speci¯c default probabilities by averaging the respective empirical
relative frequencies from both agencies.
Column 3 in table 3 gives the results. It is seen that there were no defaults at
all among the ¯rms rated AAA or AA in the 1998 - 2002 period, with the ¯rst
defaults occurring in grade A. Also, defaults are relatively more frequent, for
a given letter grade, among debtors who had obtained that grade from S&P.
Columns 4 and 5 give the historical 4-year default frequencies as reported by
the agencies themselves. They show that, apart from grades AAA and AA, the
4-year default rates in our sample are somewhat higher than the historical ones
reported by the agencies themselves. The main reason is that our horizon covers
the years 2001 and 2002, which saw an exceptionally large number of defaults:
70 of the 209 defaults in our sample occurred in 2001 and 58 occured in 2002.
On the other hand the default rates reported by the agencies are averages of
1018 (S&P) or 30 (Moody's) four-year default horizons, covering various stages
of the business cycle.
Table 3:
Empirical default probabilities (%)
our sample historical
Grade
Moody's S & P average Moody's S & P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AAA / Aaa 0 0 0 0.04 0.07
AA / Aa2 0 0 0 0.16 0.17
A / A2 0.40 0.56 0.48 0.36 0.48
BBB / Baa2 2.52 3.16 2.84 1.69 2.58
BB / Ba2 15.31 19.25 17.41 8.76 11.69
B / B2 35.71 43.20 39.32 27.04 27.83
C / C 68.68 73.91 71.15 55.05 51.25
On should note, however, that the rating agencies themselves are rather re-
luctant to attach default probabilities to their letter grades. Or, to put it
di®erently, the observed relative default frequencies should, strictly speaking,
not be seen as probabilities of default predicted by the agencies. Both Moody's
and S & P for instance acknowledge that a letter grade of, say, AA, implies
di®erent probabilities of default in an economic downturn than in an economic
upswing. In addition, ratings do not only incorporate default expectations but
also expected loss, given default, so the relative frequencies in table 3 should
only be viewed as rough indicators of predicted probabilities of default.
Still, such predicted probabilities of default are what is needed in modern cap-
ital allocation models and in setting reserves in the banking industry, so there
is an enormous interest in correctly mapping letter grades into probabilities
(Falkenstein 2000, Carey and Hrycay 2001, Carey 2002, Bluhm et al. 2003
11and many others). The techniques employed for this mapping, other than sim-
ply taking historical averages, are outside the scope of the present paper. For
instance, it is well known that default probabilities are a nonlinear function
of rating notches (if the latter are put at equal distances on the horizontal
axis), and that there is considerable noise in empirical relative default fre-
quencies. In addition to averaging across time, some additional smoothing is
therefore sometimes applied across rating grades to eliminate any remaining
random noise (see e.g. Bluhm et al., 2003, pp. 21 { 26). One can for instance
¯t an exponential curve to the observed default frequencies in order to obtain
a smooth and increasing sequence of default probabilities. Such issues will not
be touched upon in this paper, as we are mainly concerned with systematic
di®erences in forecasting ability, not with short-run e®ects induced by random
deviations from a long run performance standard. The upshot is that, even
if one does not fully believe in the mapping introduced above, the following
empirical comparison is still useful as a kind of "what if"-analysis which shows
how to proceed if forecasts were indeed of a probabilistic kind.
124 The relative performance of the probability
forecasts
We start by checking the partial orderings from Section 2. Figure 1 shows
the Moody's and S&P power curves, as derived from table 2, with + and -
subdivisions lumped together. It is seen that the power curves intersect, albeit
slightly, so the rating agencies cannot be compared according to this criterion.
Figure 1: Power curves for Moody's and S&P
To obtain a similar result for the VM-criteria, table 4 lists the respective
distributions of class frequencies, given default and given no default. It shows
that Moody's dominates S&P with respect to VM(d) and that S&P dominates
Moody's with respect to VM(nd). This comes as no surprise in view of
theorem 1 in KrÄ amer (2005), which states that the VM-ordering implies the
Gini-ordering. As Moody's and S&P cannot be compared according to the
Gini-ordering, they cannot be compared to the VM-ordering a forteriori.
13The most one could hope for is comparability according to either VM(d) or
VM(nd), but not according to both (in the sense that one dominates the
other according to both criteria). This is exactly what we ¯nd.
Table 4:
Conditional grade distributions given default










AAA / Aaa 0 55 0 42
AA / Aa2 0 325 0 321
A / A2 3 861 2 824
BBB / Baa2 19 1352 15 1326
BB / Ba2 65 1545 47 1503
B / B2 192 1712 152 1692
C / C 209 1718 209 1718
As to the re¯nement ordering, we have to check calibration ¯rst. Here we have
the problem that the data are not consistent with the fact that both agencies
are well calibrated, at least if the distribution q(aj) of borrowers across rating
grades aj from table 2 can be viewed as typical for the agencies. A necessary
condition for calibration is that the overall predicted relative frequency of
default p(1) be the same for both agencies. Plugging the default probabilities











shows that we obtain di®erent results for Moody's and for S&P. This is so no
matter which column of table 3 is used for the predicted default probabilities aj.
14For instance, taking our own estimates from column 3 gives P S&P(1) = 9:89%
and P M(1) = 11:80%. For other columns, discrepancies are even larger.
One way out of this dilemma is to acknowledge that the equivalence of
the rating grades established in table 3 is not quite correct, i.e. that a
rating of BBB by S&P implies a (slightly) di®erent predicted probability
of default than a rating of Baa2 by Moody's. This in turn implies that
we have k = 14 rather than k = 7 predicted probabilities of default
(taking table 3 as our point of departure), with the probabilities them-
selves given for instance by columns 4 and 5. Plugging these probabilities
into formula (8) gives p(1) = 8:02% for Moody's and p(1) = 7:15% for
S&P, so we still have the result that calibration for both agencies is incon-
sistent with the data.
However, if we identify realized default frequencies with predicted ones, both
agencies are well calibrated by de¯nition. It then makes sense to check whether
one is more re¯ned than the other. We call this the empirical re¯nement or-
dering. Table 5 gives the results. It shows that the integrals of the distribution
functions intersect, so none of the agencies is in this sense more re¯ned than the
other. The non-comparability of the default predictions in terms of the empir-
ical re¯nement ordering implies that di®erent scalar measures of performance
will rank the predictions di®erently (KrÄ amer 2006). Most popular among these








15Table 5: Second order stochastic dominance
of the distributions q(ai)
ai Moody's S&P
(%) q(ai) Integral q(ai) Integral
0 16.66 0 16.87 0
0.40 26.21 0.065 0 0.067
0.56 0 0.135 27.97 0.094
2.52 26.73 0.978 0 0.976
3.16 0 1.418 26.31 1.259
15.31 10.85 9.977 0 9.906
19.25 0 13.043 12.40 12.706
35.71 15.26 26.289 0 26.463
43.20 0 33.171 15.26 32.471
68.67 4.31 57.832 0 57.933
73.91 0 70.111 1.19 70.065
where pi is the predicted probability of default, and µi = 1 in case of default
and µi = 0 in case of no default. It takes its optimum value of B = 0 when the
only predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1, and when predictions are
always correct (= perfect foresight). It takes its worst value of B = 1 when
the only predicted probabilities of default are 0 and 1, and when always the
opposite of what has been predicted occurs.
If we attach to each borrower the default probability from table 3, column 4
(Moody's) and column 5 (S & P), we obtain
B
M = 0:0684; B
S&P = 0:0735: (9)
16If we attach to each borrower the default probability from table 3, column 3,
we obtain
B
M = 0:0662; B
S&P = 0:0689; (10)
and if we attach to each borrower the observed default rate of the class these
borrower has been sorted into, we obtain
B
M = 0:0660; B
S&P = 0:0686: (11)
As small values of the Brier score are "good", Moody's outperforms S&P ac-







`n(jpi + µi ¡ 1j): (12)
The logarithmic score is always negative, with closeness to zero signalling a
good performance. For our data set, it takes the following values if default
probabilities from table 3 are used:
L
M = ¡0:2185; L
S&P = ¡0:2313 (column 4 and 5)
L
M = ¡0:2116; L
S&P = ¡0:2191 (column 3)
L
M = ¡0:2109; L
S&P = ¡0:2184 (column 1 and 2)
As large values of the logarithmic score are "good", Moody's outperform S&P
also according to this criterion. They also outperform S&P according to the






jpi + µi ¡ 1j
q
p2




M = 0:9236; S
S&P = 0:9173 (column 4 and 5)
S
M = 0:9259; S
S&P = 0:9226 (column 3)
S
M = 0:9263; S
S&P = 0:9229 (column 1 and 2)
As the spherical rule is always positive, with large values signalling superior
performance, Moody's wins here as well.
However, it is easy to ¯nd scores such that this ranking is reversed. This reversal
is made possible by the noncomparability of Moody's and S&P in terms of the
empirical re¯nement ordering. It is well known that second order stochastic










for all continuous convex functions g on the unit interval. On the other hand,
it is also well known (see e.g. Winkler 1996; the basic theorem is due to
Savage 1971) that, for well calibrated forecasters, all proper scoring rules






with some strictly convex function g. For the Brier score, for instance, we have
g(p) = p(1 ¡ p): (16)
If second order stochastic dominance fails, one can therefore always ¯nd two
convex functions f and g (corresponding to two proper scoring rules Sf and
Sg) such that the ranking of two forecasters is reversed.




[ln(jpi + µi ¡ 1j) ¡ ln(jc + µi ¡ 1j)]= ¡ ln(1 ¡ c) pi · c
[ln(jpi + µi ¡ 1j) ¡ ln(jc + µi ¡ 1j)]= ¡ ln(c) pi ¸ c
: (17)
Setting c = 0:001 and equating observed default rates to predicted ones, we
obtain values of L¤;M = 0:2446 and L¤;S&P = 0:2456, so S&P is slightly better
now. For details, see KrÄ amer (2006).
5 Statistical Signi¯cance
Next we explicitly acknowledge the randomness in our data and brie°y com-
ment on the statistical signi¯cance of the di®erences in performance which we
have found. For instance, the accuracy ratios derived from ¯gure 1 are 0.833
for Moody's (ARM) and 0.819 for S & P (ARS), so there is a slight but in-








is asymptotically chi-squared with one degree of freedom. Approximating the
variances ¾2
ARS and ¾2
ARM and the covariance ¾ARS;ARM of the respective ac-
curacy ratios ARS and ARM by bootstrapping produces a p-value of 0.087,
which does not indicate a systematic di®erence.
The asymptotic null distribution of the T-statistic (18) should be applied with
caution, however. It assumes two independent simple random samples from
the bivariate distributions [qM(ajj1);qS(qjj1)] and [qM(ajj0);qS(ajj0)], respec-
tively, with sample sizes n1 and n2 ¯xed in advance. None of these requirements
19is met in the credit rating context. If we consider the 1927 ratings from the
present paper as a random sample from a hypothetical universe of potential
ratings, then the sample sizes n1 and n2 are not ¯xed but random and per-
fectly negatively correlated. And more importantly, a sample of n observations
from the bivariate distribution r(µ;a) will in practice never be simple as the
observed µ's are known to be positively correlated in practice. As the observed
values of µ and a for a given borrower are also highly correlated, this can then
be shown to translate into correlation among draws from the conditional dis-
tributions q(aj1) and q(aj0), which are therefore not a simple random sample.
As H0 in our case is not rejected anyway, we do not investigate this issue any
further here.
The same argument applies even more forcefully when assessing the signi¯cance
of the di®erence of other scalar measures of performance. For the Brier score,











where ¼i = (pS
i + pM
i )=2, is asymptotically standard normal when population
Brier scores are identical. In our sample, Z takes the value 3.80, which at ¯rst
sight is highly signi¯cant. However, as in the case of the Engelmann et al. T-
statistic, its limiting null distribution obtains only for simple random samples,
which in the rating context will almost never be observed in practice due to
the positive correlation among the µ's.
Diebold and Mariano (1995) show how to account for such correlations in a
time series context. This approach might well translate into a cross-section
environment, but we do not investigate this here any further since, for our
data set, there do not seem to exist signi¯cant di®erences anyway.
206 Discussion
The basic message of our empirical application is that none of the two leading
rating agencies seems to uniformly outperform the other (uniformly across
measures of performance), con¯rming independent results from e.g. Ederington
et al. (1987) or Moon and Stotsky (1993), who show that ratings by either
agency convey information not contained in the rating of the other.
There are some shortcomings in our data, however. For instance, in order to
obtain a reasonable data base, we had to collect all ratings as of Dec. 31, 1998
irrespective of the date the rating was produced or changed. This implies that
the relative default frequencies from columns (1) - (3) in table 3 are for a
horizon of slightly more than four years. For insurance, if a rating was issued
on July 1 1998, the time horizon for default is four years and a half.
However, as "no change" need not imply "no assessment of creditworthyness",
and since both Moody's and S&P are known for keeping a close track of their
customers, the presumption is that the ratings observed in December 1998
closely mirror the then prevailing creditworthiness of the ¯rms considered in
our empirical example. Also, there are no large deviations in the age of the
ratings between Moody's and S&P, so this "ragged edge" problem is unlikely
to favor either of them.
Another question of course is whether or not our sample can be taken as
typical for the performance of the agencies. It does not for instance cover a
full business cycle but rather the end and apex of an extraordinary upswing
and the beginning of a downturn in 2001 and 2002, were the majority of the
defaults occurred. This might bias the absolute performance of both rating
agencies. But since we are mainly concerned with relative performance, this
possible sample bias is probably not as serious as it might seem at ¯rst sight.
21References
Bluhm, C., Overbeck, L. and Wagner, L. (2003): An introduction to
credit risk modelling, Boca Raton (Chapman & Hall/CRC).
Brier, G.W. (1950): "Veri¯cation of forecasts expressed in terms of proba-
bility." Monthly Weather Review 78, 1 { 3.
Carey, M. (2002): "Some evidence on the consistency of banks' internal
credit ratings." In: M. Ong (ed.) Credit ratings: Methodologies, Ratio-
nale and Default Risk, London (Risk Books).
Carey, M. and Hrycay, M. (2001): "Parameterizing credit risk models
with rating data." Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 197 { 270.
Crouhy, M., Galai, D. and Mark, R. (2001): "Prototype risk rating
systems." Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 47 { 95.
DeGroot, M. and Fienberg, S.E. (1983): "The comparison and evalua-
tion of probability forecasters." The Statistican 32, 12 { 22.
Diebold, F.X. and Mariano, R.S. (1995): "Comparing Predictive Accu-
racy." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13, 99 { 118.
Ederington, L.H. (1986): "Why split ratings occur." Financial Manage-
ment 16, 47 { 47.
Ederington, L.H., Yawitz, J.B. and Roberts. B.E. (1987): "The in-
formational content of bond ratings." Journal of Financial Research 10,
211 { 226.
Engelmann, B., Hayden, E. and Tasche, D. (2003): "Testing rating
accuracy." Risk 16, 82 { 86.
Falkenstein, E. (2000): "Validating commercial risk grade mappings: why
and how." Journal of Lending and Credit Risk Management, Feb., 26 {
33.
KrÄ amer, W. (2003): "Die Bewertung und der Vergleich von Kreditausfall-
prognosen." Kredit und Kapital 36, 325-340.
KrÄ amer, W. (2005): "On the ordering of probability forecasts." Sankhya
67, 662 { 669.
KrÄ amer, W. (2006): "Evaluating probability forecasts in terms of re¯ne-
ment and strictly proper scoring rules." Journal of Forecasting 25, 223 {
226.
22Moon, C.G. and Stotsky, J.G. (1993): "Testing the di®erence between
the determinante of Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings: An appli-
cation of smooth simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation." Journal
of Applied Econometrics 8, 51 { 69.
Redelmeier, D.A., Block, D.A. and Hickam, D.H. (1991): "Assessing
predictive accuracy: How to compare Brier scores." Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology 44, 1141 { 1146.
Savage, L.J. (1971): "Elicitation of personal probabilities and expecta-
tions." Journal of the American Statistical Association 66, 783 { 801.
Sobehart, J. and Keenan, S. (2001) : "Measuring default risk accura-
tely", Risk, 31 { 33.
Vardemann, S. and Meeden, G. (1983): "Calibration, su±ciency and
domination: Considerations for Bayesian probability assessors." Journal
of the American Statistical Association 78, 808 { 816.
Winkler, R.L. (1994): "Evaluating probabilities: Asymmetric scoring
rules." Management Science 40, 1395 { 1405.
Winkler, R.L. (1996): "Scoring rules and the evaluation of probabilities."
Test 5, 1 { 60.
23CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2140 Lorenzo Cappellari, Paolo Ghinetti and Gilberto Turati, On Time and Money 
Donations, November 2007 
 
2141 Roel Beetsma and Heikki Oksanen, Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, November 2007 
 
2142 Hikaru Ogawa and David E. Wildasin, Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, 
Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking, November 2007 
 
2143 Alessandro Cigno, A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Legislation on Marriage, 
Fertility, Domestic Division of Labour, and the Education of Children, November 2007 
 
2144 Kai A. Konrad, Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common, November 2007 
 
2145 Ola Kvaløy and Trond E. Olsen, The Rise of Individual Performance Pay, November 
2007 
 
2146 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Yannis Georgellis, Nicholas Tsitsianis and Ya Ping Yin, 
Income and Happiness across Europe: Do Reference Values Matter?, November 2007 
 
2147 Dan Anderberg, Tax Credits, Income Support and Partnership Decisions, November 
2007 
 
2148 Andreas Irmen and Rainer Klump, Factor Substitution, Income Distribution, and 
Growth in a Generalized Neoclassical Model, November 2007 
 
2149 Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Direct 
Democracy – A First Global Assessment, November 2007 
 
2150 Axel Dreher, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider, The Devil is in the 
Shadow – Do Institutions Affect Income and Productivity or only Official Income and 
Official Productivity?, November 2007 
 
2151 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, International 
Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Stabilization, November 2007 
 
2152 Balázs Égert and Dubravko Mihaljek, Determinants of House Prices in Central and 
Eastern Europe, November 2007 
 
2153 Christa Hainz and Hendrik Hakenes, The Politician and his Banker, November 2007 
 
2154 Josef Falkinger, Distribution and Use of Knowledge under the “Laws of the Web”, 
December 2007 
  
2155 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Apart? A Tale of Two 
Republics: Estonia and Georgia, December 2007 
 
2156 Morris A. Davis and François Ortalo-Magné, Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents, 
December 2007 
 
2157 Andreas Haufler and Christian Schulte, Merger Policy and Tax Competition, December 
2007 
 
2158 Marko Köthenbürger and Panu Poutvaara, Rent Taxation and its Intertemporal Welfare 
Effects in a Small Open Economy, December 2007 
 
2159 Betsey Stevenson, Title IX and the Evolution of High School Sports, December 2007 
 
2160 Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya, Persuasion as a Contest, December 2007 
 
2161 Morten Bennedsen and Christian Schultz, Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services, 
December 2007 
 
2162 Bas Jacobs, Optimal Redistributive Tax and Education Policies in General Equilibrium, 
December 2007 
 
2163 Christian Jaag, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, Pension Reform, 
Retirement and Life-Cycle Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2164 Dieter M. Urban, Terms of Trade, Catch-up, and Home Market Effect: The Example of 
Japan, December 2007 
 
2165 Marcelo Resende and Rodrigo M. Zeidan, Lionel Robbins: A Methodological 
Reappraisal, December 2007 
 
2166 Samuel Bentolila, Juan J. Dolado and Juan F. Jimeno, Does Immigration Affect the 
Phillips Curve? Some Evidence for Spain, December 2007 
 
2167 Rainald Borck, Federalism, Fertility and Growth, December 2007 
 
2168 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium 
Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2169 Egil Matsen and Øystein Thøgersen, Habit Formation, Strategic Extremism and Debt 
Policy, December 2007 
 
2170 Torben M. Andersen and Allan Sørensen, Product Market Integration and Income 
Taxation: Distortions and Gains from Trade, December 2007 
 
2171 J. Atsu Amegashie, American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity 
Contest?, December 2007 
 
2172 Patricia Apps and Ray Rees, Household Models: An Historical Perspective, December 
2007  
2173 Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner, The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality 
and Trust – An Experimental Study, December 2007 
 
2174 Michael Melvin and Magali Valero, The Dark Side of International Cross-Listing: 
Effects on Rival Firms at Home, December 2007 
 
2175 Gebhard Flaig and Horst Rottmann, Labour Market Institutions and the Employment 
Intensity of Output Growth. An International Comparison, December 2007 
 
2176 Alexander Chudik and M. Hashem Pesaran, Infinite Dimensional VARs and Factor 
Models, December 2007 
 
2177 Christoph Moser and Axel Dreher, Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor 
Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets, December 2007 
 
2178 Alessandra Sgobbi and Carlo Carraro, A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues 
Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin, December 2007 
 
2179 Christa Hainz, Creditor Passivity: The Effects of Bank Competition and Institutions on 
the Strategic Use of Bankruptcy Filings, December 2007 
 
2180 Emilia Del Bono, Andrea Weber and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Clash of Career and 
Family: Fertility Decisions after Job Displacement, January 2008 
 
2181 Harald Badinger and Peter Egger, Intra- and Inter-Industry Productivity Spillovers in 
OECD Manufacturing: A Spatial Econometric Perspective, January 2008 
 
2182 María del Carmen Boado-Penas, Salvador Valdés-Prieto and Carlos Vidal-Meliá, the 
Actuarial Balance Sheet for Pay-As-You-Go Finance: Solvency Indicators for Spain and 
Sweden, January 2008 
 
2183 Assar Lindbeck, Economic-Social Interaction in China, January 2008 
 
2184 Pierre Dubois, Bruno Jullien and Thierry Magnac, Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in 
LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence, January 2008 
 
2185 Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Ward E. Romp and Siert J. Vos, Intergenerational Risk Sharing, 
Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply in General Equilibrium, January 2008 
 
2186 Lans Bovenberg and Coen Teulings, Rhineland Exit?, January 2008 
 
2187 Wolfgang Leininger and Axel Ockenfels, The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is 
there a Neeskens-Effect?, January 2008 
 
2188 Sándor Csengődi and Dieter M. Urban, Foreign Takeovers and Wage Dispersion in 
Hungary, January 2008 
 
2189 Joerg Baten and Andreas Böhm, Trends of Children’s Height and Parental 
Unemployment: A Large-Scale Anthropometric Study on Eastern Germany, 1994 – 
2006, January 2008  
2190 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A Public 
Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an 
Application to British Household Data, January 2008 
 
2191 Harry Garretsen and Jolanda Peeters, FDI and the Relevance of Spatial Linkages: Do 
third Country Effects Matter for Dutch FDI?, January 2008 
 
2192 Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse and Theon van Dijk, Price Discrimination Bans on 
Dominant Firms, January 2008 
 
2193 M. Hashem Pesaran, L. Vanessa Smith and Takashi Yamagata, Panel Unit Root Tests in 
the Presence of a Multifactor Error Structure, January 2008 
 
2194 Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle and Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Consumption 
Taxes ever really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real 
Goods, January 2008 
 
2195 Mika Widgrén, The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future 
EU, January 2008 
 
2196 Antonis Adam, Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and the Import 
Demand Function, January 2008 
 
2197 Helmut Seitz, Democratic Participation and the Size of Regions: An Empirical Study 
Using Data on German Counties, January 2008 
 
2198 Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach, Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions, 
January 2008 
 
2199 Chiara Dalle Nogare and Roberto Ricciuti, Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal 
Policy Choices?, January 2008 
 
2200 Andreas Bühn and Friedrich Schneider, MIMIC Models, Cointegration and Error 
Correction: An Application to the French Shadow Economy, January 2008 
 
2201 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, Anticipating Tax Change: Evidence 
from the Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform of 2005, January 2008 
 
2202 Walter Krämer and André Güttler, On Comparing the Accuracy of Default Predictions 
in the Rating Industry, January 2008 